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THIRD THOUGHTS ON RUST v. SULLIVAN
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT-DEAN
STONE'S SUPPOSED KILLER HYPO
Professor Van Alstyne had it right the first time, when he defended the Supreme Court's decision in Rust v. Sullivan on the
ground that it is no offense to the first amendment for government
to fund one kind of professional consulting service but not another,
and to insist upon that choice by directing what kind of consultive
service it is paying for and to refuse to allow some other program to
be furthered "on its nickel." It had seemed to me that if the preferred and disadvantaged messages had been more closely aligned
with standard predilections, this would have been better appreciated. (Some suggestions: high school anti-smoking counseling or
programs promoting racial tolerance.)
But Van Alstyne seemed to be stumped by a counter example
offered by Dean Stone: government funds legal assistance to poor
but non-indigent criminal defendants, and precludes advice about
fourth amendment rights in a way thought to be analogous to the
Title X preclusion of advice about abortion rights. The distinctions
between the two cases offered by Dean Stone both involve judgments so complex, fancy and controversial as to put in doubt
whether the two cases really can be distinguished and that therefore
the Rust rationale must fail. But there is a ready and straightforward distinction that condemns the fourth amendment case and
leaves the Court's (and Van Alstyne's) reasoning quite intact.
In addition to the fourth amendment right (which is the analogue to the Roe right) there are independent constitutional rights
to due process of law and assistance of counsel. Government interference with a defendant's criminal defense in the way suggested in
the hypothetical offers an argument that one or both of these constitutional rights have been violated in any ensuing trial and conviction. But in the Title X case there is no independent constitutional
right apart from the Roe right (which analogizes to the fourth
amendment right). To invoke Roe again is double counting. Or it
is to posit an affirmative right to government assistance in the exercise of Roe rights-which is just what Harris v. McRae settled to the
contrary, and it was the real purpose of this litigation to unsettle.
Or it is to suggest that there is some right to uninterfered with med161
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ical advice, to a doctor-patient relation that satisfies the canons of
the AMA, or some other such thing. There may be such rights as a
matter of morality or of professional ethics, but they are not constitutional rights. And to argue that the right in the counselling situation is just the first amendment free speech right is to argue in a
circle.
Charles Fn'ed •
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